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Jeremy Engels

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# Floating Bombs Encircling Our Shores: Post-9/11 Rhetorics of Piracy and Terrorism

Jeremy Engels  
*Pennsylvania State University*

This essay considers the relationship between piracy, terrorism, and post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy as it is outlined in the *National Security Strategy of the United States (NSSUS)*. The *NSSUS*'s discursive formation undertakes two noteworthy rhetorical maneuvers: It confuses *piracy* with *terrorism*, thereby shifting focus away from piracy as theft toward the threat of terrorism at sea, or "floating bombs," and it nationalizes terrorism, thereby making terrorists subject to retaliation by the U.S. military. Because post-9/11 distinctions between terrorists, those who pursue violence for political ends, and pirates, those who pursue violence for profiteering ends, have become increasingly difficult to substantiate in the American social imaginary, the collapse of these two categories signifies a final conflation of state power and economic power into one homogenizing, all-consuming force called *empire*. At the same time, piracy has become a formidable form of global capitalism sharing many characteristics with the doctrines enumerated by the *NSSUS*.

On January 5, 2004, several masked men boarded *Cherry 201*, an oil tanker sailing off the coast of Indonesia's province of Aceh, taking 13 crewmen hostage at gunpoint. These pirates were thieves, hijackers, and good capitalists, for they attempted to maximize their profits by claiming the boat and cargo as theirs, and then, on threats of execution, demanding a ransom of \$400 million rupiah (about U.S. \$50,000) for the entire crew. *Cherry 201*'s owners negotiated the ransom down to \$70 million rupiah (U.S. \$8,500)—a mere \$650 for each crewman. However, thinking the pirates would become restless or the crew would escape, the owners reneged on their promise; after holding the crew hostage for a month, the pirates executed four crewmen while nine others escaped by jumping overboard. This event demonstrates the fears of predatory violence associated with commerce in an interconnected world and its acceptance—the owners, after all, did drop their demands. This event, therefore, encapsulates four points about piracy: It preys on the shipping lanes that sustain international capitalism, it is profitable, it is nation-less, and it is deadly (Dillon, 2004; International Chamber of Commerce [ICC], 2004a).

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Roughly 15 months earlier, on September 19, 2002, President George W. Bush sent the *National Security Strategy of the United States* (*NSSUS*; 2002) to Congress. By declaring that “History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger [of a terrorist attack similar to 9/11] but failed to act,” this document announces a radical new direction in U.S. foreign policy: preemptive warfare (preface). As the *NSSUS* states, “We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends” (p. 14). Ellen Meiksins Wood (2003) argues that this document authorizes the United States to carry on “an open-ended war with no limits of time or geography” (p. 150), providing the opportunity for the United States to become, as a Foreign Policy in Focus essay (Foreign Policy in Focus Advisory Committee, 2002) argues, “an international vigilante—acting at once as cop, judge, and executioner.” Indeed, the *NSSUS* states that America’s “responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and to rid the world of evil” (p. 5). Because *evil* operates as a rhetorical term that can be deployed to justify the execution of any number and variety of enemies, President Bush has used the *NSSUS* to turn himself into a rhetorical and military warrior, clearing the world of rogue states and nation-less terrorists, as rhetorical critics Stephen Hartnett and Laura Stengrim (2004, 2006a, 2006b) have demonstrated. It thus makes sense that just as the *NSSUS* creates an elastic discourse of evil justifying endless militarism, it also creates a discursive formation in which terrorists are compared to pirates. Indeed, the *NSSUS* defines *terrorism* as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents” (p. 5), and then argues that “all acts of terrorism are illegitimate . . . terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all must oppose” (p. 6). The *NSSUS* thus brings together four distinct forms of violence into the same discursive space: terrorism, slavery, piracy, and genocide.

The *NSSUS* creates a discourse about the illegitimate forms of violence that will be punished by the United States. However, this discursive formation is riddled with internal tensions. On one hand, and in spite of the United States’ historical complicity in the genocide of Native Americans and the enslavement of African Americans, most Americans agree that genocide and slavery are to be avoided at all costs. Equating terrorism with genocide and slavery is, therefore, a relatively straightforward association. On the other hand, comparing terrorism to genocide and slavery is confusing because the latter evils exhibit something that terrorism often does not: traceability. Generally, genocide and slavery can be pinned down because both occur in the bounded spaces of nation states. Although it is thus possible to isolate the spaces in which slavery and genocide occur, it is much more difficult to identify the spatial or political networks supporting terrorists. In fact, comparing terrorism to piracy brings out a feature of terrorism that is contrary to slavery and genocide: its statelessness.

Although rhetorically powerful, then, the discursive space created by comparing terrorism to piracy, slavery, and genocide is problematic. To compare terrorism to

piracy emphasizes terrorism's statelessness; however, to fulfill the *NSSUS's* intention to rid the world of terrorists, the evildoers must first be located. Terrorism is a shadowy doppelganger of piracy: Both are decentralized networks of troublemakers floating across national boundaries, preying on innocents such as those aboard the *Cherry 201* or those working in the World Trade Center. To escape "justice," terrorists go underground; pirates, on the other hand, float in oceanic liminality: they do not go underground, but between lands. If terrorism is comparable to piracy, then, it is because both float between boundaries and because both are equally difficult to manage tactically. To fulfill its appointed role of ridding the world of evil, the *NSSUS* needs terrorism to occur in a bounded space where U.S. military forces can destroy the contagion, yet like boundary-shirking piracy, terrorism transcends the geographic boundaries of nations.

This essay considers this discursive formation—which I label the rhetoric of "floating bombs"—in three steps. First, I investigate piracy as it has been constructed in America's "social imaginary." Here, I demonstrate that piracy in the post-9/11 world is only discussed in conjunction with terrorism, or, in other words, pirates must become floating bombs rather than simply thieves on the high seas of global capitalism to grace the pages of newspapers or be mentioned in public addresses. Second, I analyze the post-9/11 strategies employed by President Bush to cope with terrorism, demonstrating that his dominant rhetorical strategy is nationalizing terrorism, hence geographically situating the enemy so that the U.S.'s power to retaliate can be conclusively demonstrated. Third, I consider piracy as emblematic of what Michel Foucault called "heterotopia," which is a state in which violence transcends space. These considerations lead to the conclusion that piracy, as represented in the attack on *Cherry 201*, has become a noteworthy type of renegade global capitalism that, perhaps surprisingly or perhaps not, shares certain characteristics with U.S. foreign policy as outlined in the *NSSUS*. Indeed, both are violent responses to the fiscal opportunities of political crises and globalization.

### **"Two Men in a Little Boat": The Threat of Global Piracy**

Because 95% of the world's commodities are transported by ship, and 60% of the world's oil is conveyed by tanker, pirates threaten the lanes of trade sustaining global capitalism. The violence of *Cherry 201* has become common in waters from East Asia to Africa to the Caribbean. "This has increased the stakes in these kinds of attacks to a dangerous level," Captain Pottengal Mukundan, the director of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)—a division of the International Chamber of Commerce that issues weekly, monthly, and yearly reports about pirates—said after the murder of the four crewmen on *Cherry 201*. He continued, "It is vital that action is taken by Indonesian authorities to ensure that vessels off the northern coast of Sumatra can navigate in safety. We hope that the perpetrators of this act will be caught and punished appropriately" (ICC, 2004a, ¶ 6). However, because the theft, hijacking, and murder on the *Cherry 201* occurred outside the territorial waters of Indonesia, it has proved difficult to catch, much less punish, the perpetrators. The need to catch and

punish pirates is acute, for the frequency of pirate attacks has tripled since the IMB began keeping records in 1991. The total number of reported attacks from 1991 to 2003 totals 3,347. The IMB's annual report for 2002 lists the following statistics: 370 total attacks, 6 sailors killed, 50 wounded, 38 missing, and 38 thrown overboard. The annual report for 2003 demonstrates an escalation in pirate violence: 445 total attacks, 21 sailors killed, 71 missing, and 359 hostages. Piracy has had a financial impact beyond this tremendous loss of human life: According to the IMB, pirates steal nearly \$16 billion dollars from the world economy each year. In short, the seas are becoming a dangerous place to conduct global business.<sup>1</sup>

The IMB's weekly reports are posted in the cabins of the world's ships. The report for the week of March 2-8, 2004, lists a hijacked tugboat and barge:

09.02.2004 at midnight between Lingga and Bintan islands, Indonesia

The tug *Singsing Mariner* and barge *Kapuas 68* under tow departed from Satui, Kalimantan, Indonesia on 29.1.2004 bound for Butterworth, Malaysia, with 3,000 mt of palm oil. Four pirates boarded the barge and kidnapped all five crewmembers of the barge and landed them at Mesanak Island. Local police arrested the pirates. The tug unaware of the kidnap of the barge crew, continued sailing. Tug last contacted the owners on 12.02.2004 at 1500 hrs. Thereafter, there is no communication from the tug and barge and it is feared they have been hijacked by another gang of pirates. The fate of the tug's crew are unknown. (ICC, 2004b)

The hijacking of *Kapuas 68* offers a glimpse of the quotidian violence that the world's sailors face every day, and the IMB's subsequent report of the event suggests the defenselessness of all crews. Here, a barge carrying 3,000 megatons of palm oil—an oil used for cooking and for making soap—fell prey to marauding pirates who, along with the crew, remain silent. The IMB's reports are characterized by choppy prose and an all-too-frequent repetition of the jarring words that invoke a silent death, “the crew's fate is unknown.” As the IMB's reports make clear, defending ships varying in size from tiny yachts to elephantine oil tankers from determined pirates is surprisingly difficult. The steady mechanization and downsizing of the shipping industry since 1991 has left ships with a lack of manpower, and when ships are making weeklong journeys from port to port, constant vigilance is impossible. Pirates are often armed with guns and operate by the element of surprise; indeed, in 2003 the number of attacks like the one near Aceh involving guns rose to 100 from 68 in 2002. Thus, even when ships are on alert, pirates can quickly storm a ship and overwhelm its helm before an alarm is sounded. Although crews on large ships do not have time to get to their weapons, crews on smaller ships are advised to avoid weapons, for the sight of a gun moves already-anxious pirates closer to atrocity. Indeed, with adrenaline pumping, defensive weapons have translated into death for sailors by provoking pirates to escalate their violence from theft to murder. Accordingly, a ship's best defenses are their floodlights and fire hoses. Unfortunately, these precautions are often overmatched by pirates with grappling hooks, speedboats, and semiautomatic machine guns.<sup>2</sup>

Successful pirates employ violence and intimidation to secure plunder, which can then be sold for a hefty profit on black markets. Economists and political

scientists including Amy Chua (2004, pp. 23–48), Chalmers Johnson (2000/2004, pp. 193–215), and Joseph Stiglitz (2003, pp. 89–132) have analyzed the devastating consequences that globalization has had on developing economies like Indonesia's, near where the *Cherry 201* was attacked. Here, *globalization* refers to the aggressive deployment of the Washington Consensus's program of privatization, liberalization, and foreign investment, often producing catastrophic effects on developing economies, as the East Asia crisis of 1997 suggests (Finnegan, 2003). By steadfastly adhering to the Washington Consensus, the policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank exacerbated a localized crisis in South Korea and Thailand into a general East Asian economic meltdown, shaking investor confidence and plunging billions into poverty. In the wake of this crisis, black markets prospered in Asia and in other parts of the world. In Iraq, a black market has developed for the trash from American army bases (Fassihi, 2004; McCarthy, 2004), and off the Nigerian coast, female pirates rob the laundromats of hijacked ships to provide clothing for their children (Burnett, 2002, pp. 117, 181–182). As *Cherry 201* and *Kapuas 68* suggest, markets for goods that must be refined and processed, like crude oil and palm oil, have developed alongside markets for readily usable goods like CDs and clothing. The globalization of neo-liberal capitalism thus brings unstable markets to all corners of the globe, providing opportunities for pirates to become an underclass of shadowy capitalists, profiting through violent coercion and physical intimidation.

Piracy has deep historical roots. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker (2000) demonstrate in *The Many-Headed Hydra* that pirates have attacked global shipping since the 1600s. Attempting to counter violence with law, piracy has traditionally been defined as violence at sea for “private ends” (*animo furandi*). Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,” and the major U.S. legislations relating to piracy—the Act of 1790, the Act of May 15, 1820, the Act of March 3, 1847, and the Code of 1909—define *piracy* as *animo furandi*. Article 101 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 1982), written in 1982 and ratified in 1994, defines *piracy* as “any illegal acts of violence or detention, of any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft” (pp. 60–61). Building on this definition, the IMB defines *piracy* as “An act of boarding or attempting to board any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act” (Dillon, 2005, p. 156). Both definitions foreground the assumption that piracy is violence for private ends, including murdering for crude oil and hijacking for clothing. However, the *NSSUS* breaks with these definitions of *piracy* as theft by confounding piracy with political terrorism.<sup>3</sup>

Piracy is a grave danger to neo-liberal global capitalism following the dictates of the Washington Consensus, yet discussions of piracy in the United States shift attention from *animo furandi* toward piracy as terrorism. Following 9/11, piracy enters into the United States' *social imaginary*, to use Charles Taylor's (2002) term, predominately as “terrorism,” thereby rhetorically masking piracy's statelessness or a pirate's intention to plunder for private gains. This confusion is consistent with

the general trends in post-9/11 international discourse. The Flag Officer commanding the Eastern Command of India's navy, Vice Admiral O. P. Bansal, argued in November 2003,

If you do small theft and small time piracy, it is bad, but not that bad. But there is a piracy of a different angle. If someone is to hijack a super tanker which has only up to 10 crew on board and some 300,000 tonnes of fuel on board, you can do a lot with it, terrorism basically. (Press Trust of India, 2003, ¶ 7)

"Terrorism basically" implies hijacking an oil tanker and transforming it into a floating bomb that, when exploded in a port such as Singapore, Boston, or Galveston, would wreak more havoc than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. Although piracy itself remains largely unchallenged, the threat of floating bombs has catalyzed several instances of international cooperation, including the Indonesian navy sending warships into the Malacca Straights in February 2002, and China and India rehearsing joint naval exercises in 2003. For many nation states, piracy as theft is "not that bad"; however, piracy as terrorism warrants decisive military action.

In a 2002 *New York Times* article titled "Warnings From Al Qaeda Stir Fear that Terrorists May Attack Oil Tankers," journalist Keith Bradsher demonstrates that pirates are worth discussing only as floating bombs. Bradsher details the story of Noer Rahman, an experienced Indonesian sailor, who, as his oil tanker *The Petro Ranger* leaves the shores of Indonesia, "was getting ready to fight pirates and terrorists." Bradsher also quotes *The Petro Ranger's* chief officer Fong Chung-chen, who, tired from fighting the good fight against terrorists and pirates, wants to retire: "Pirates and now terrorists—after January, I'm going to sign off, maybe find a job ashore." Bradsher is only interested in piracy because of its terrorist possibilities. He would most certainly agree with Joseph Brandon, the associate director of the Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., who argued in January 2004 that "since the trend in modern piracy is becoming more bloody and ruthless, it is also a form of terrorism that affects the crew, passengers and ship owners" (Ong, 2004, n.p.). This discursive link between terrorism and piracy suggests a foundational rule for discussions of piracy in the United States: Piracy is politically relevant only when it is floating bombs, when it is no longer piracy as *animo furandi*. In short, in post-9/11 public discourse, to speak of piracy is to speak of the threat of floating bombs encircling our shores. That violence at sea is significant only when it is terrorism becomes clear in the discourse following the bombing of the *USS Cole* in 2000 and the bombing of the French tanker *Limburg* in 2002.<sup>4</sup>

Launched from Norfolk in 1995, the 505-foot *USS Cole* was docked for refueling off the coast of Yemen on the steamy hot afternoon of October 12, 2000, when a small fishing boat pulled alongside it and exploded, leaving a gaping 40-by-20 foot hole in the ship and killing 17 U.S. sailors. The attack resonated in symbolic value, for terrorists targeted a ship that, with its high-tech weapons capable of dispensing far-reaching death, was a symbol of American power and invincibility. Its destruction

demonstrated beyond a doubt America's vulnerability to low-tech enemies on small, inconspicuous ships. As an editorial in the *New York Times* argued, "To attack the ship, the rouges were much too clever to seek comparably sophisticated weapons of their own; it was easier to use two men in a little boat" (Dudley, 2000, p. A30). When two men in a tiny floating bomb can cripple even the mightiest destroyer, then no naval force is safe, not even the one deployed by the United States. Another column in *The New York Times* voiced this painful lesson: "The United States is an unrivaled military superpower, with its precision guided weapons, well-trained troops and global reach. So instead of fighting the Pentagon on its own terms, the nation's enemies have been looking for its Achilles' heel" (Gordon, 2000, p. A11). That Achilles' heel was a warship anchored in an unfriendly port.

Following the bombing, many Americans cried out for vengeance (Usborne, 2000, p. 3). Taking a break from his campaign debates with Al Gore, then-Texas governor Bush made the reassuring gesture of revenge, remarking, "Let's hope we can gather enough intelligence to figure out who did the act and take the necessary action." For him, "There must be a consequence" (Burns & Myers, 2000, p. A1). Editorials demanding some sort of retaliatory consequence impugned the anticipated Clinton response of mere rhetoric. A retired U.S. Navy lieutenant commander wrote,

The attack on a United States navel vessel should generate an immediate and unmistakable response from our government. Alas, words will be the response. Scores of sailors and grieving families will have to be satisfied with words. The perpetrating government and responsible group will gloat. (Komzelman, 2000, p. A18)

Another editorial argued in the same vein:

Could the charge that we have a hollow military have been in part responsible for this tragedy? We are strong and we are ready. . . . It's time for the rhetoric to recognize the reality, and to stop putting politics ahead of the country's interest. (Marshall, 2000, p. A18)

As many writers feared, the response was only words by President Clinton (2000a), who shirked action, saying only "If, as it now appears, this was an act of terrorism, it was a despicable and cowardly act. We will find out who was responsible and hold them accountable" (p. A12).

However, because there was no clear culprit to be reprimanded and punished, the retaliation Americans demanded was difficult to achieve. As one *The New York Times* observer wrote on October 17, 2000, "if the past is any guide, the identities of these men in a small boat will remain in the world of shadows and conjecture" (Ajami, 2000, p. A31). At the memorial for the fallen *USS Cole* sailors on October 18, Clinton (2000b) reassured his audience by saying,

To those who attacked them, we say: you will not find a safe harbor. We will find you, and justice will prevail. America will not stop standing guard for peace or freedom or stability in the Middle East and around the world. (§ 12)

When Clinton finished his speech, John Clodfelter of Mechanicsville, Virginia, whose son Kenneth was listed as missing, said, "When the people who did this are punished, let them go with three words, 'Remember the Cole.'" Clinton's response to this gesture—he leaned over his podium, saluted the guests, and said simply, "Thank you, sir"—is telling because his vague rhetoric of retaliation had to be vague (Myers, 2000, p. A10). Following the attack, no group took credit; and though newspapers speculated that it was related to Palestinian attacks on Israeli soldiers, to Saddam Hussein's desire for revenge against the United States, and to Osama bin Laden, there was no obvious perpetrating government or responsible group to target for retaliation as the identities of the attackers remained obscured in shadow and conjecture.

A similar attack occurred 2 years later on October 6, 2002, when the 158,000 ton *Limburg*, a French supertanker chartered to the Malaysian oil firm Petronas, was broad-sided off the coast of Yemen by a smaller ship that exploded, ripping a large hole in the ship's protective lining. The blast killed one crewmember and spilled 90,000 barrels of oil into the ocean, polluting more than 45 miles of Yemeni coastline (Clark, 2002; Henley, Macalister, & Borger, 2002). As Harry Banga, the vice chairman of a Hong Cong shipping company explained, oil tankers like the *Limburg* transporting the life-blood of capitalist societies are easy prey for pirates and terrorists: "Tankers are sitting ducks. They don't have any security. They don't have any protection" (Banerjee & Bradsher, 2002, p. C3). Slow moving and understaffed, tankers are often overtaken by hijackers armed with grappling hooks and machine guns. The most-destabilizing effect of the *Limburg* attack was that Lloyd's of London, the underwriter of many vessels traveling through the Middle East, increased its insurance rates for ships between 3 and 10 times (Fang, 2002). Indeed, the IMB now speaks of maritime time in "post-Limburg" terms: "Post-Limburg, we cannot continue to hope for the best and ignore the lessons" (ICC, 2003b, ¶ 4).

The variability of insurance rates in a "post-Limburg" world suggests the dangers pirates pose to neo-liberal global capitalism. Indeed, pirates physically threaten shipping by stealing cargo and killing sailors, and they rhetorically threaten it by provoking the anxiety-provoking impression that the high seas are too dangerous for commerce—which in turn causes underwriters such as Lloyd's of London to inflate their insurance rates, thereby making shipping less profitable for capitalists. In their eye-opening book *Insurance as Governance*, Richard Ericson, Aaron Doyle, and Dean Barry (2003) demonstrate that because insurance rates are related to perceived risk, insurance agencies attempt "to produce knowledge of risk by objectifying everything into degrees of chance of harm" (p. 5). Because Lloyd's of London prints the scariest headlines about the terrorist possibilities of piracy, they believe that the risk of a terrorist attack at sea is likely. Dominick Armstrong (2004) warns the readers of *Lloyd's List* that

Maritime terrorism is a ticking timebomb: The global supply chain is in jeopardy. Pirates have evolved from clusters of commercial plunderers to a sinister and organised force that relishes the prospect of toying with the levers of the world economy. (Article title)

and David Osler (2005) crafts a similarly frightening title for his article in *Lloyd's List*: "We ignore threats at our peril: We may think terrorist attacks are unlikely, but, if they happen, they will be devastating—and piracy is a real threat." I suspect that the history of pirates and also privateers (those licensed by their government to seize enemy ships and impress enemy sailors) might be rewritten as a history of the effect of this "real threat" on insurance agencies, for these bandits threatened shipping—and hence the modern system of capitalism itself—in the 18th and 19th centuries by provoking anxious underwriters to raise insurance rates beyond what early global merchants could afford. The same is true today.

Pirates are physically dangerous because they can kill sailors and destroy physical property, and also threatening rhetorically. Indeed, pirates are dangerous in the same way that U.S. Federal Reserve Board chairman Alan Greenspan is dangerous to investors in the world's stock markets. As Michael Kaplan (2003) demonstrates, federal interest rates and finance capitalism are rhetorical performances: a simple gesture by Greenspan that is interpreted as a prediction of an economic downturn causes downturn by prompting investors to remove funds from markets. The insurance business is similar because its rates ebb and flow to the degree that a perception of danger is rhetorically constructed. Today, tottering as it is on the brink of civil war, many underwriters refuse to insure businesses in Iraq because the war-torn nation is, and has been rhetorically portrayed, as dangerously unstable (Klein, 2004b). Insurance on the high seas is analogous; if insurers panic over the increasing possibility of their cargo being hijacked, like *Cherry 201*, or bombed, like the *Limburg*, then insurance rates rise accordingly. The bombing of the *Limburg*, and the subsequent rhetoric from the IMB hailing a new age of sea violence, functioned rhetorically like a Greenspan wink or an Iraqi firefight: by creating a state of emergency, market confidence sank, and protective measures including bloated insurance rates were the cautionary results.

Because pirates robbing vessels and terrorists blowing them up cause insurance rates to skyrocket, violence at sea is strategic for those seeking to cause global chaos. Indeed, pirates demonstrate that physical violence and rhetorical violence are intertwined in our globalized world that is increasingly discursive. Osama bin Laden suggested as much when he praised the attack on the *Limburg* for the destabilizing effects it had on the confidence of global capitalists:

By exploding the oil-tanker in Yemen, the holy warriors hit the umbilical cord and lifeline of the crusader community, reminding the enemy of the heavy cost of blood and the gravity of losses they will pay as a price for their continued aggression on our community and looting of our wealth. (Whitaker, 2002, ¶ 7)

The *London Times* reported that a spokesman for the Islamic Army of Aden told the *Asharq Al-Awsat* newspaper on October 11: "We would have preferred to hit a US frigate, but no problem—they are all infidels" (Sage & McGrory, 2002, p. 20). London's *Guardian* labeled the attack "the most serious and successful attack by the terrorist network since September 11" (Henley & Stewart, 2002, ¶ 6). The attack

was so serious precisely because the attackers did not care if they hit a military target (such as the *USS Cole* or the Pentagon), an economic target (such *Cherry 201* or the *Limburg*), or a political target (such the World Trade Center). Indeed, for Bin Laden, the U.S.'s political aggression and financial looting were one and the same, and by attacking a commercial tanker, terrorists attempted to force Americans to ponder the political and financial costs of U.S. foreign policy. If any ship associated with "infidels" was a target, and it was "no problem" whether terrorists hit a frigate or an oil tanker, then attacks on political and economic interests could come from anywhere, and target anything, at any time. This ambiguous threat created anxiety for military and nonmilitary sailors alike—and it also made prevention and retaliation difficult even for the world's mightiest navy.

The pre-9/11 bombing of the *USS Cole* and the post-9/11 bombing of the *Limburg* provoked harsh responses precisely because they demonstrated the threat of floating bombs. The bombings of the *USS Cole* and the *Limburg* were terrorism; indeed, subsequent investigations demonstrated that Al Qaeda was responsible for both. Yet the *USS Cole* and *Limburg* bombings provoked discussions and received media coverage that the hijackings of *Cherry 201* and *Kapuas 68* did not. Thus, even as the threat of modern piracy multiplies like a hydra, violence on the high seas is most important to Americans when incorporated into the discursive formation of floating bombs. The problems of discussing piracy as theft are revealed by analyzing President Bush's post-9/11 methods of diffusing the anxiety caused by terrorism. Following 9/11, the rhetorical strategy of the Bush administration was nationalizing terrorism, which in turn had the benefit of creating a geographical place on which the Bush administration's power to punish terrorists could be demonstrated, and America's need for vengeance could be satisfied.

### **"We Will Plant Our Flag on the Ground": Nationalizing Terrorism**

To understand the discursive formation of floating bombs, the clock must be turned back to 9/11. The immediate reaction to 9/11 was shock and disbelief; psychologists argued that Americans "were exposed and raw, suddenly weakened, even somewhat helpless" (Lifton & Strozier, 2001, p. CY7). New York City was awash in chaos: "The scenes of horror were indelible; people who left from the broken towers, people who fought for pay phones, people white with soot and red with blood" (Schmemmann, 2001, p. A1). Equally troubling was the enemy's agonizing silence. An astonished teacher and novelist, Mary Gordon (2001), wrote on September 16,

There may have been many instances in history where war has been declared anonymously, but I don't know of any. To have an enemy with no name and therefore no face, or even worse, a name and a face that can only be guessed at, is the stuff of nightmare. (p. CY4)

Confronted with horrors and insulting silences, Americans' confidence in the invulnerability of the nation's borders was shattered, and they were helpless to fight back.

Waking from what many Americans imagined to be the worst of all nightmares, some spoke of caution, including the editors of *The Nation* (2001): "It is essential to stick to hard facts, not fearsome shadows or injured hubris (or the xenophobic hatreds already in the air)" (p. 3). However, many U.S. citizens made sense of chaos by calling for revenge (see, for instance, Apple, 2001, p. A1). On September 11, President Bush (2001a) comforted Americans: "Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America" (§ 5). Unfortunately, however, the best of America would soon slide toward retaliation—which is not surprising, because, as René Girard (1972/1977) demonstrates in his historical anthropology of violence, *Violence and the Sacred*, grave acts of violence produce a psychological need for revenge. On September 13, writing from Jerusalem, foreign policy analyst Thomas Friedman (2001) wondered, "Does my country really understand that this is World War III?" (p. A27). The answer was yes, because rhetoric such as Friedman's transformed and amplified the U.S. response into a "war," as did President Bush's.

It is necessary to focus on President Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric because his words were constitutive of how Americans viewed terrorism. As Robert Ivie (2005) writes in *Democracy and America's War on Terror*,

The president's profile of terrorism, it goes almost without saying, was the single most influential interpretation of the danger at hand. It was his role and the responsibility of his office to shape public opinion, to put events in perspective, and to set the nation on a sensible course of action. (p. 127)

"Unfortunately," Ivie concludes, "the president chose to view terrorism through the prism of war" (p. 128). In his first public message after the bombings, the president (Bush, 2001a) labeled his administration's response to 9/11 a "war," hence escalating America's response and putting 9/11 "in perspective" by describing a global war against then unknown enemies: "America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism" (§ 11). It is not surprising to note, with fear officially being channeled into war rhetoric, calls for retaliation were then heard from sea to shining sea. As one astute writer noted,

Having donated more blood than victims needed, having wallpapered their towns with flags, and with little choice but to stew over television reruns of terror in their homeland, more than a few Americans are beginning to obsess about how to get even. (Harden, 2001, p. A15)

"I know just what to do with these Arab people," Phil Beckwith, a retired truck driver and former Navy officer, noted. He generated an extremely violent, racist response to his helplessness: "We have to find them, kill them, wrap them in a pigskin and bury them. That way they will never go to heaven" (Harden, 2001, p. A15). This was the xenophobia that the editors of *The Nation* worried about; and in spite of the President's statements (Bush, 2001e) that "The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam," (§ 4) some Americans defamed anyone with a dark complexion and an Arabic sounding name.

Ultimately, as David Altheide (2004) demonstrated, Americans would be called on to channel their anger into consumption, thereby boosting the economy and performing their American identity. Yet observers such as Mr. Beckwith were not alone, and consuming could only ease their pain so much in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Indeed, the combination of frustration and patriotism following 9/11 led to vengeance, as an article in the *New York Times* (Harden, 2001) reported: “Eager to do something, anything, to relieve their frustration, Americans today bought guns and ammunition, inquired about military service, planned patriotic celebrations for the weekend and let their anger run loose in conversation” (p. A15). Although Americans were primed to retaliate, another *New York Times* article (“The War Against America,” 2001) reported that

this is an age when even revenge is complicated, when it is hard to match the desire for retribution with the need for certainty. We suffer from an act of war without any enemy nation with which to do battle. (p. A26)

Following the bombings, many conversations compared 9/11 to the infamous December 7, 1941, Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor. The 9/11 attacks were no Pearl Harbor, though, because they were perpetrated “by highly unconventional forces under the command of still unidentified parties with unknown ambitions” (Kennedy, 2001, p. WK11). The stinging, frustrating unknown made retaliation difficult. Americans demanded swift retaliation; however, it was impossible to retaliate against ghosts, shadows, and whispers.

President Bush (2001b) thus faced a challenging rhetorical situation following 9/11, as he acknowledged on September 12:

The American people need to know that we’re facing a different enemy than we have ever faced. This enemy hides in shadows, and has no regard for human life. This is an enemy who preys on innocent and unsuspecting people, then runs for cover. But it won’t be able to run for cover forever. This is an enemy that tries to hide. But it won’t be able to hide forever. This is an enemy that thinks its harbors are safe. But they won’t be safe forever. (§ 3)

Here, the president’s repetition is a rhetorical marker of desperation: as if saying it over and over again would make it true, as if his very words would make the bad guys appear so they could be brought to justice, President Bush (2001c) announced that the United States would find the mysterious enemies and punish them. On September 15, he said (Bush, 2001c) similarly,

This is a conflict without battlefields or beachheads, a conflict with opponents who believe they are invisible. Yet, they are mistaken. They will be exposed, and they will discover what others in the past have learned: Those who make war against the United States have chosen their own destruction. (§ 2)

Both speeches promise the exposition of invisible terrorists, for it is difficult to fight terrorists while they run and hide; however, there is hope because the enemy cannot hide forever.

Fighting terrorism is challenging because terrorists float between and through borders, utilizing unconventional methods of war and defying traditional military strategy. Terrorists are, as the president argued, an enemy unlike any America has defeated. Following 9/11, Americans needed vengeance—only they had no targets. President Bush managed this rhetorical situation masterfully. On September 16, he announced (Bush, 2001d), “I want to remind the American people that the prime suspect’s organization is in a lot of countries—it’s a widespread organization based upon one thing: terrorizing” (§ 20). However, quickly after September 16, the murkiness of terrorism was rhetorically transformed into an evil enemy situated within the geography of a nation: in place of a shadowy foe, the Taliban arose. By September 20, with evidence for 9/11 pointing to al Qaeda, he (Bush, 2001f) announced the United States’ plans to bomb and destroy the Taliban regime:

The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda’s vision for the world. . . . And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. (§ 17, 20)

Here, then, the president created a physical target in a concrete location on which to demonstrate American power and enact American vengeance.

As Michael Scott Doran (2001) writes, the U.S.’s reckless militant response to 9/11 was precisely what terrorists desired: “When a terrorist kills, the goal is not murder but something else—for example, a police crackdown that will create a rift between government and society that the terrorist can then exploit for revolutionary purposes” (p. 31). Hence, “Osama bin Laden sought—and has received—an international military crackdown, one he wants to exploit for his particular brand of revolution” (p. 31). Not realizing this, or perhaps simply not acknowledging it, President Bush’s post 9/11 strategy was to nationalize terrorism, thereby satisfying the need for vengeance that festered following 9/11, which was caused in part by his rhetorical choice not to calm but instead to escalate the stakes of America’s response toward something along the lines of World War III. In the context of this discursive formation of international fear and global violence, localizing terror in concrete nation-states was useful because these states—Afghanistan and then Iraq—could be decimated by American bombs.

After 9/11, philosopher Michael Hardt (2002) argued that U.S. rhetoric was “based on a nostalgia for the era of national sovereignty,” partly because “there is no sovereign nation-state that can be held accountable for the tragedy and attacked in turn through a war effort” (§2; see also Hardt & Negri, 2000, pp. 325-350). However, Hardt dismissed the power of President Bush’s rhetoric to construct evil nations to pummel with patriotic bombs, because following 9/11, the president localized terrorists by imagining a convenient symmetry between terror and corrupt governments like the Taliban in Afghanistan. His September 20 (Bush, 2001f) speech demonstrated this strategy of nationalizing terrorism: “We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (§30).

The false dichotomy created by this familiar cliché was deployed when speaking about nations and not individuals or corporations because nations are convenient entities that can be engaged through familiar forms of war. On September 20, he argued (Bush, 2001f), “the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows” (§ 33). On October 17, after the bombing in Afghanistan began, he said (2001h),

we’ve reached a pivotal moment in history, where we will plant our flag on the ground—a flag that stands for freedom—and say to anybody who wants to harm us or our friends or allies, you will pay a serious price, because we’re a nation that is strong and resolved and united. (§ 25)

The president’s speeches thus repeatedly invoke “place.” Indeed, terrorism is shadowy; however, to be managed it must grow in the geographical confines of nations; therefore, Americans will plant their flag on the ground in Afghanistan. President Bush thus countered the widespread feelings of helplessness following 9/11 by locating a scapegoat nation on which to place blame and drop bombs.

The real test for the president’s strategy of nationalizing terrorism was the anthrax scare. On October 23, 2001, after the first waves of panic, President Bush (2001i) was asked about anthrax; his answer shifted the discussion to the bombing of Afghanistan:

This country is too strong to allow terrorists to affect the lives of our citizens. I understand people are concerned, and they should be. But they need to know our government is doing everything we possibly can to protect the lives of our citizens—everything. We’re waging an aggressive campaign overseas to bring al Qaeda to justice. (§ 13)

The president claims to protect Americans from anthrax by bombing al Qaeda and the Taliban. Shifting the grounds of discussion is a sneaky rhetorical maneuver, because anthrax is amorphous; however, bombing Afghanistan is not. The logic driving this rhetorical construction of national terrorists is revealed in a question-and-answer session following this speech. Asked about the relationship between the anthrax attacks and al Qaeda, and forced to think on his feet, President Bush (2001i) stammered and stuttered through the following response:

Well, we don’t have any hard evidence. But there’s no question that anybody who would mail anthrax with the attempt to harm American citizens is a terrorist. And there’s no question that al Qaeda is a terrorist organization. So it wouldn’t put it past me that there—you know, it wouldn’t surprise me that they’re involved with it. But I have no direct evidence. I do know that this country is strong enough to endure, to endure the evil ones. And we’re making great progress on the ground in Afghanistan, and we’ll bring the al Qaeda to justice, and we’ll—we’re doing everything we can to find out who mailed these letters. (§ 24)

The president here demonstrated his comfort with deploying the term *terrorism* to demonize and nationalize an unnamed enemy. Paradoxically, by October 2001

*terrorism* had become a term of comfort. In the midst of murky anthrax threats, terrorist violence was comfortable because it was nationalized, and hence could be defeated by the American military. Following the success of nationalizing terror in Afghanistan, rhetorically binding terrorism to nation-states became the norm with the declaration of war on Iraq. In fact, President Bush's (2002) infamous "axis of evil" State of the Union Address nationalized the threat Americans face from terrorists by recalling the rhetorical vocabulary from World War II (Bostdorff, 2003), when the United States fought nations, not shadows.

Thus, American anger following 9/11 was channeled at other nations, and 9/11 became the grievance sanctioning American empire. As Thomas de Zengotita (2003) writes, "When we do look back at the beginnings of Empire, 9/11 will loom over the horizon of the past, inaugurating an age, justifying all that followed" (p. 32). The *NSSUS* (2002) couples "rogue states and terrorists" into a potent doublet announcing the United States' strategy of preemptive violence against dissident nations:

Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose . . . so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action. (p. 15)

Following 9/11, the threat of stateless terrorism was immediately transformed into the threat of rogue nations. The president managed terrorism by nationalizing it; and when deadly, amorphous anthrax appeared in the mail, he deflected attention from the post to the blinding brilliance of bombs over Baghdad.

### **Piracy, Globalization, and Heterotopia**

The *NSSUS* undertakes two noteworthy rhetorical maneuvers: It confuses piracy with terrorism, thereby shifting focus away from piracy as theft toward the threat of floating bombs, and it nationalizes terrorism, thereby making it subject to retaliation by the U.S. military. Because post-9/11 distinctions between terrorists, those who pursue violence for political ends, and pirates, those who pursue violence for profiteering ends, have become increasingly difficult to substantiate, the collapse of these two categories signifies a final conflation of state power and economic power into one homogenizing, all-consuming force called *empire*. This conflation is an illuminating and an obscuring discursive maneuver. On one hand, it suggests that American empire is based on the deployment of military violence for political and profiteering ends. On the other hand, it reveals the limits of contemporary discursive formations, suggesting that piracy cannot enter public discourse unless it is coupled with terrorism.

Following the World Trade Center (WTC) attacks, President Bush (2001g) reassured Americans by arguing, "The terrorists attacked the World Trade Center, and we will defeat them by expanding and encouraging world trade" (¶ 17). Invoking

neo-liberalism's religious faith in economics, which has become "the theodicy of our contemporary culture" (Bigelow, 2005, p. 33), this quotation suggests that world trade will defeat terrorism. It will do this, the *NSSUS* (2002) argues, by spreading morals and bringing "real freedom" to an oppressed world:

The concept of "free trade" arose as a moral principle even before it became a pillar of economics. If you can make something that others value, you should be able to sell it to them. If others make something that you value, you should be able to buy it. This is real freedom, the freedom for a person—or a nation—to make a living. (p. 18)

"Real freedom" for American empire is the ability to purchase commodities. This is a moral principle because, in the lexicon of empire, poverty leads to terrorism and wealth to stability. Free trade aids the United States by opening markets for its goods, and it challenges poverty by bringing goods to the world's poor—thus, it is doubly valuable, by creating wealth at home and alleviating poverty abroad. Indeed, the *NSSUS* (2002) suggests that poverty has a progressive relationship leading to violence: "Fathers and mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and to live free from poverty and violence" (p. 3). *Poverty* thus becomes a synonym for *violence*, and hence for *terrorism*, *slavery*, *piracy*, and *genocide*. By substitution, then, free trade combats the violence threatening global fathers, mothers, and children.

Following the *NSSUS*'s logic, combating terrorism entails exporting capitalism to the world's poor, which has created a golden opportunity for predatory capitalists—corporations and pirates. The collapse of politics and economics into empire has translated into staggering profits for government-related firms including the Carlyle Group, Halliburton, Bechtel, Lockheed-Martin, and others. In the midst of this financial nepotism, whereby the U.S. military opens new markets, and military-industrial corporations exploit them to earn bloated profits, Iraq has collapsed into violence. The U.S. occupation has brought little stability; on the bright side, after 1 year of war, Iraq received its first soft-drink bottling plant manufacturing Pepsi-Cola, its first car dealership since 1968 selling Hyundais, an Arabian music awards, and an investment fund for pension and insurance money ("Amid Fighting," 2004; "Arab World," 2004; "Islamic Investment Fund," 2004).<sup>5</sup>

The war on Iraq demonstrates that American empire is based on the economic exploitation of markets held captive by the U.S. military. Justified by a rhetoric of *free market capitalism*, this empire sanctions violence against the world's poor even as it feigns the desire to help them, and hence its actions are consistent with the predatory nature of capitalism itself. David Harvey (2003) argues that in a system of global capitalism, "One of the state's key tasks is to try to preserve that pattern of asymmetries in exchange over space that works to its own advantage" (p. 32). Harvey claims that nations follow a territorial logic of power, meaning that they create and sustain spatial inequalities assuring cheap labor and under-saturated markets (pp. 79-81; see also Harvey, 1990/1995, pp. 173-188). Accordingly, U.S. capitalism needs certain nations to remain in poverty, just as it requires other nations to achieve moderate wealth, thereby becoming consumers for U.S. commodities. This system, in which U.S. military might is deployed to ensure that the territorial logics of power remain

favorable to the United States, also, as an unintended consequence, creates the conditions for piracy to develop as a far-reaching, profitable form of renegade global capitalism preying on world trade. Stiglitz (2003) defines *globalization* as

the closer integration of the countries and the peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders. (p. 9)

This “unification of the economic field” (Mattelart, 1996/2000, p. 75) has created interlocking networks for transporting goods and information at impressive speeds; yet as finance capital flows across borders, and as oil travels between lands, the nodes at which global capital is exposed to resistance and breakdown are multiplied exponentially. If the world has indeed become flat, as Thomas Friedman (2005) claims, then this makes it easier for pirates to plunder; hence, pirates are the bastard stepchildren of globalization feeding off the fringes of world trade.

Although pirates represent a form of renegade global capitalism, in American public discourse they are potential terrorists and not rogue capitalists. This discursive maneuver hence redefines *piracy* in terms that are discursively manageable. In *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Michel Foucault (1969/1972) claims that discursive formations have rules: “The question posed by language analysis of some discursive fact or other is always: according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made?” (p. 27). By shifting the perspective of analysis from an author’s intentions to the cultural formations of power permitting an author to express certain ideas and not others, the question of authorship following Foucault can be understood as a question of possibility. Building on his work in *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Foucault (1984) asks his readers to pay attention to the conditions under which discourse is produced and to who is allowed to be an author and who is not. This begs the question: which discursive rules make it possible and necessary for the *NSSUS* to compare pirates with terrorists?

The answer has to do with questions of space. As a form of capitalism that transcends national boundaries, piracy represents the breakdown of a spatial locus from which events originate (like the nation-state). Pirates symbolize what Foucault (1966/1984) called “heterotopia,” which is the destruction of a “common locus” from which events arise (pp. xvii-xviii; see also Foucault, 1997). Piracy represents a world in which violence is not nationalized but instead can come from any place at any time and is hence problematic for a discourse that is required to nationalize its enemies. Pirates, however, are the unintended predatory consequence of world trade, turning the tools of globalization, including ships and machine guns, against the system. This is an old dialectic, as Linebaugh and Rediker (2000) demonstrate, because pirates in the 17th and 18th centuries preyed on the ships that made expanding colonial empires possible, and “By the 1720s, thousands of pirates had deeply damaged world shipping” (p. 172). These pirates were stamped out by a calculated program of state violence, as “Hundreds were hanged, and their bodies

left to dangle in the port cities of the world as a reminder that the maritime state would not tolerate a challenge from below” (p. 173).

The resurgence of piracy in the post-9/11 world suggests that modernity follows a predictable dialectic; as trade expands, predators arise to prey on that trade. In a manner of speaking, then, globalization, based on the ability to deploy the military to control markets, produces its own antithesis. In his frighteningly prescient *Jihad vs. McWorld*, Benjamin Barber (1995) made a similar dialectical argument about the relationship between globalization and terrorism; terrorism is thus “blowback” (Johnson, 2000/2004). Indeed, as Ivie (2005) writes, “Terrorism today, regardless of America’s myopic innocence, is firmly rooted in a violent history of empire since World War II” (p. 124). Piracy and terrorism are dialectically linked to American empire, as empire produces the conditions that spawn pirates and terrorists. Yet the existence of pirates is contradictory to an emancipatory rhetoric suggesting that the spread of free trade will bring peace to the world. Piracy is thus the counterexample to the *NSSUS*’s argument that exporting free market democracy will stabilize the global economy. Furthermore, piracy is spatially problematic because the dangerous multiplication of pirates represents the arrival of what columnist Paul Starobin (2004) has labeled “a proverbial state of nature,” in which violence is unpredictable and everywhere. Pirates hail the dawn of a Hobbesian world in which violence is the ultimate arbiter of social relations. However, by linking pirates and terrorists, and hence nationalizing them, pirates become discursively manageable.

Although this rhetorical maneuver has been persuasive in helping Americans to think of pirates as terrorists, it is problematic because it obscures the relation between piracy and American empire. As Garry Wills (2004) demonstrated, this endless war on terror without boundaries does not comply with traditional definitions of “just war.” Even worse for rhetoricians attempting to extol the necessity, benevolence, and justice of American empire is that piracy mirrors the doctrines expressed in the *NSSUS*, because both are violent responses to the fiscal opportunities of political crises and globalization. Unlike terrorists, who destroyed the WTC for political ends, pirates employ profitable violence. Floating on the world’s boundless oceans, pirates do not discriminate between victims; they prey on those who are easily taken, murdering and pillaging for profit. Hence, *piracy* is not a synonym for *politically motivated, nationalized terrorism* but has become a potent post-9/11 form of renegade global capitalism in its own right. In a heterotopic world, pirates that possess guns and grappling hooks will, like the United States, with its deadly bombs and nationalizing rhetoric, deploy violence for profit without concern for who is victimized. The expanding American empire and resurgent piracy are also linked, with pirates preying on the overreach of an empire fattened by its boasts and attempts to police the world.

## Notes

1. For statistics on pirate attacks, see Burnett (2002, pp. 11-12), Halloran (2003), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC; 2003c), and International Maritime Bureau (IMB; 2002).

2. On the attack strategies of pirates, and defenses against them, see Burnett (2002, p. 178), Glass (2003), ICC (2003b), IMB (2004), Raban (2004), and “Singapore Urges” (2003).

3. On piracy laws and inapplicability of these national laws to the anarchic “law of the high seas,” see Dubner (1980, pp. 6-7), Langewiesche (2004), Morrison, (1932, pp. 893-902), Rubin, (1988, pp. 294-295), and United Nations (1982, 2003).

4. For further instances of piracy being discussed as terrorism at sea, see Burnett (2005a, 2005b) and “Piracy and Terrorism” (2004).

5. For statistics on contracts awarded for rebuilding Iraq, see [www.usaid.gov](http://www.usaid.gov). For discussions of the American empire’s collapse of politics and profit, see Chatterjee (2004), Fishman (2002), Hartnett and Stengrim (2006a), Hartung (2004), Hogan (2002), Jeserich (2004), Johnson (2003), Kellner (2004), Klein (2004a, 2004b), and Shorrock (2002).

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**Jeremy Engels** He has published essays in *The Quarterly Journal of Speech and Rhetoric & Public Affairs*, and his research investigates how nations are built and sustained through rhetorical invention, the repression of disorder, and calculated displays of violence.